[lancaster_psu98]

One of the centerpieces of President Bush's counter-offensive against his Iraq war critics will be a Republican National Committee commercial focusing on a speech given by former President Bill Clinton.

U.S. News & World Report says the RNC ad will spotlight Clinton's Feb. 17, 1998 speech on Iraq, where the former prez "guaranteed" that Saddam Hussein would use his weapons of mass destruction.

"Let's imagine the future," Clinton said seven years ago. "What if [Saddam] fails to comply [with U.N. sanctions], and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop this program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made?"

Clinton warned: "He will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction.

"And some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal." Other soundbytes from Democratic flip-floppers will feature WMD warnings from Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.

http://www.newsmax.c...13/131646.shtml

This post has been edited by lancaster_psu98: 14 November 2005 - 11:46 AM

[usedmeat]

... a speech given by former President Bill Clinton.

... will spotlight Clinton's Feb. 17, 1998 speech

... Clinton said seven years ago.

Clinton warned: ...

President Monkey, never one to take responsiblity for anything.

Other soundbytes from Democratic flip-floppers will feature WMD warnings from Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi.

Patriotic Americans who never believed that a sitting president would never tell bold faced lies on a matter that would have such grave consequences.

[cyberscribbler]

By this defintion, Colin Powell is also a flip-flopper.

Russert:In February of 2003, you put your enormous personal reputation on the line before the United Nations and said that you had solid sources for the case against Saddam Hussein. It now appears that an agent called Curveball had misled the CIA by suggesting that Saddam had trucks and trains that were delivering biological and chemical weapons. How concerned are you that some of the information you shared with the world is now inaccurate and discredited?

Powell: I'm very concerned. When I made that presentation in February 2003, it was based on the best information that the Central Intelligence Agency made available to me. We studied it carefully; we looked at the sourcing in the case of the mobile trucks and trains. There was multiple sourcing for that. Unfortunately, that multiple sourcing over time has turned out to be not accurate. And so I'm deeply disappointed. But I'm also comfortable that at the time that I made the presentation, it reflected the collective judgment, the sound judgment of the intelligence community. But it turned out that the sourcing was inaccurate and wrong and in some cases, deliberately misleading. And for that, I am disappointed and I regret it.

The fact that the administration's push for war wasn't even about WMD in the first place.

No one really knew what Saddam was doing between 1998 and 2002. And US intelligence made a lot of very poor assumptions based on sketchy hints and clues. But the solution, at least the first part of it, was to get inspectors in on the ground and actually find out. That is what President Bush's very credible threat of force had done by the Fall of 2002. But once there the inspectors began making pretty steady progress in showing that many of our suspicions about reconstituted WMD programs didn't bear out, the White House response was to begin trying to discredit the inspectors themselves. By early 2003, inspections had shown that there was no serious nuclear weapons effort underway -- the only sort of operation which could have represented a serious or imminent threat. From January of 2003 the administration went to work trying to insure that the war could be started before the rationale for war was entirely discredited. They wanted to create fait accomplis, facts on the ground that no subsequent information or developments could alter. The whole thing was a con. It wasn't about WMD.

When weapons inspectors & intelligence analyst concluded that there was not a credible threat. What is the rational response: come clean.

What was Bush's decision, plow forward. As witnessed in the past, once he's made up his mind he's never wrong. He'll defend this house of cards until it's knocked completely down.

[usedmeat]

Your tiresome "Bush is a liar" mantra is clearly shown to be wishful thinking on your part. Too bad for you.

http://www.washingto...5_11/007556.php

The case for manipulation is pretty strong. It relies on several things, but I think the most important of them has been the discovery that the administration deliberately suppressed dissenting views on some of the most important pieces of evidence that they used to bolster their case for war. For future reference, here's a list of five key dissents about administration claims, all of which were circulated before the war but kept under wraps until after the war:

1. The Claim: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al-Qaeda prisoner captured in 2001, was the source of intelligence that Saddam Hussein had trained al-Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons. This information was used extensively by Colin Powell in his February 2003 speech to the UN.
   
   What We Know Now: As early as February 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency circulated a report, labeled DITSUM No. 044-02, saying that it was "likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers." Link. This assessment was hidden from the public until after the war.
   
   
   
2. The Claim: An Iraqi defector codenamed "Curveball" was the source of reporting that Saddam Hussein had built a fleet of mobile biowarfare labs. Curveball's claims of mobile bio labs were repeated by many administration figures during the runup to war.
   
   What We Know Now: The only American agent to actually meet with Curveball before the war warned that he appeared to be an alcoholic and was unreliable. However, his superior in the CIA told him it was best to keep quiet about this: "Let's keep in mind the fact that this war's going to happen regardless of what Curveball said or didn't say, and the powers that be probably aren't terribly interested in whether Curveball knows what he's talking about." Link. This dissent was not made public until 2004, in a response to the SSCI report that was written by Senator Dianne Feinstein. Link.
   
   
   
3. The Claim: Iraq had purchased thousands of aluminum tubes to act as centrifuges for the creation of bomb grade uranium. Dick Cheney said they were "irrefutable evidence" of an Iraqi nuclear program and George Bush cited them in his 2003 State of the Union address.
   
   What We Know Now: Centrifuge experts at the Oak Ridge Office of the Department of Energy had concluded long before the war that the tubes were unsuitable for centrifuge work and were probably meant for use in artillery rockets. The State Department concurred. Link. Both of these dissents were omitted from the CIA's declassified National Intelligence Estimate, released on October 4, 2002. Link. They were subsequently made public after the war, on July 18, 2003. [url=http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/iraq-wmd.html]
   

This post has been edited by usedmeat: 15 November 2005 - 02:10 AM

[usedmeat]

1. The Claim: Saddam Hussein attempted to purchase uranium yellowcake from Africa as part of his attempt to reconstitute his nuclear program. President Bush cited this publicly in his 2003 State of the Union address.
   
   What We Know Now: The primary piece of evidence for this claim was a document showing that Iraq had signed a contract to buy yellowcake from Niger. However, the CIA specifically told the White House in October 2002 that the "reporting was weak" and that they disagreed with the British about the reliability of this intelligence. Link. At the same time, the State Department wrote that the documents were "completely implausible." Link.
   
   Three months later, in January 2003, Alan Foley, head of the CIA's counterproliferation effort, tried to persuade the White House not to include the claim in the SOTU because the information wasn't solid enough, but was overruled. Link. Five weeks later, the documents were conclusively shown to be forgeries. Link. In July 2003, after the war had ended, CIA Director George Tenet admitted publicly that that the claim should never have been made. Link.
   
   
   
   
   
   
2. The Claim: Saddam Hussein was developing long range aerial drones capable of attacking the continental United States with chemical or biological weapons. President Bush made this claim in a speech in October 2002 and Colin Powell repeated it during his speech to the UN in February 2003.
   
   What We Know Now: The Iraqi drones had nowhere near the range to reach the United States, and Air Force experts also doubted that they were designed to deliver WMD. However, their dissent was left out of the October 2002 NIE and wasn't made public until July 2003. Link.
   
   
   
   
   
   

This is not This is not a comprehensive list, so feel free to add other specific examples of suppressed intelligence in comments.

This post has been edited by usedmeat: 15 November 2005 - 02:09 AM

[lancaster_psu98]

The Claim: Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, an al-Qaeda prisoner captured in 2001, was the source of intelligence that Saddam Hussein had trained al-Qaeda members to use biological and chemical weapons. This information was used extensively by Colin Powell in his February 2003 speech to the UN.

What We Know Now: As early as February 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency circulated a report, labeled DITSUM No. 044-02, saying that it was "likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers." Link. This assessment was hidden from the public until after the war.

From the Link: Mr. Libi, who was captured in Pakistan at the end of 2001, recanted his claims in January 2004.

Dems rewriting history!!!

[lancaster_psu98]

The Claim: Saddam Hussein attempted to purchase uranium yellowcake from Africa as part of his attempt to reconstitute his nuclear program. President Bush cited this publicly in his 2003 State of the Union address.

What We Know Now: The primary piece of evidence for this claim was a document showing that Iraq had signed a contract to buy yellowcake from Niger. However, the CIA specifically told the White House in October 2002 that the "reporting was weak" and that they disagreed with the British about the reliability of this intelligence. Link. At the same time, the State Department wrote that the documents were "completely implausible." Link.

Three months later, in January 2003, Alan Foley, head of the CIA's counterproliferation effort, tried to persuade the White House not to include the claim in the SOTU because the information wasn't solid enough, but was overruled. Link. Five weeks later, the documents were conclusively shown to be forgeries. Link. In July 2003, after the war had ended, CIA Director George Tenet admitted publicly that that the claim should never have been made. Link.

Now, to be fair to the president, he says, he quotes the British, saying that they have evidence that Iraq sought -- not purchased, but sought -- uranium.

Significant quantities for the purposes of reconstituting their nuclear weapons program.



But they don't say they got it. They just say they sought it.

That's correct. But there is nobody on either the Nigerien side or the Iraqi side who has said that the uranium was ever discussed in any meetings, much less that there was an active--



But technically, they had sought it? They had purchased it in the past, in the early 1980s?

That's correct, and that was a legal and legitimate purchase.

http://www.pbs.org/w...ews/wilson.html



The Claim: Saddam Hussein was developing long range aerial drones capable of attacking the continental United States with chemical or biological weapons. President Bush made this claim in a speech in October 2002 and Colin Powell repeated it during his speech to the UN in February 2003.

What We Know Now: The Iraqi drones had nowhere near the range to reach the United States, and Air Force experts also doubted that they were designed to deliver WMD. However, their dissent was left out of the October 2002 NIE and wasn't made public until July 2003. Link.

From the same article:

A defense official said some of the information that has surfaced since the war supports the argument that the UAVs were intended as delivery systems. He cited a classified report from a captive former member of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's "inner circle," who has told interrogators that shortly before the war, Hussein ordered production of UAVs sped up for attack missions.

[usedmeat]

Once again, the only defense psu has is redefining "is".

[lancaster_psu98]

Once again, the only defense psu has is redefining "is".

Funny, I don't remember redefining "is"?

Is there some deeper, inner issue here you'd like to share?

[usedmeat]

Funny, I don't remember redefining "is"?

What We Know Now: As early as February 2002, the Defense Intelligence Agency circulated a report, labeled DITSUM No. 044-02, saying that it was "likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers." Link. This assessment was hidden from the public until after the war.

From the Link: Mr. Libi, who was captured in Pakistan at the end of 2001, recanted his claims in January 2004.

What history was rewritten? The DIA says the guy can't be trusted in a report and two years later he admits it.

A defense official said some of the information that has surfaced since the war supports the argument that the UAVs were intended as delivery systems.

What part of this report says that the UAVs had intercontinental capability?

But they don't say they got it. They just say they sought it.

That's correct. But there is nobody on either the Nigerien side or the Iraqi side who has said that the uranium was ever discussed in any meetings, much less that there was an active--

This post has been edited by usedmeat: 17 November 2005 - 01:18 AM